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LOCK-IN LAWS: ADDING MORE PATCHES TO
THE MORTGAGE LENDING QUILT
Lock-in, meaning a commitment by a mortgage lender to make a prospec-
tive loan at a particular interest rate,' has only recently appeared in the
home-mortgage-industry lexicon. Before the spring of 1986, lenders rarely
offered lock-in agreements.2 Virtually no cases directly treated claims of
breach of such lock-in agreements, although many breaches apparently oc-
cuffed. In the summer of 1986,3 and even more so in the spring of 1987,'
1. This Comment uses "lock-in" to mean an agreement between a mortgage lender and a
loan applicant, executed prior to loan approval, and made contingent upon the lender subse-
quently committing to make the loan within a fixed period of time. During this period, the
lender and borrower agree to lock in the current market interest rate, and in some cases, other
terms and conditions for any future loan contract. Although borrowers may request lock-ins
after loan approval, post-approval lock-ins seldom cause any problem. Lenders generally
abide by such agreements because loan approval usually indicates that closing is imminent.
With closing imminent at the time of the lock-in, lenders have less time and fewer reasons to
back out.
A lock-in differs from a floating application. In the latter, the parties refrain from setting
the terms and conditions of any loan agreement they may enter into until closing, based on the
prevailing market terms at that time.
2. Before 1986, lenders commonly would quote the current market rates at the time a
borrower made application. But lenders never clearly intended such quotes as binding agree-
ments. Rather, they tacitly meant only to inform the applicant of the current state of the
market, with the unrealistic expectation that the applicant grasped all of the subtleties of the
mortgage industry that could contribute to the failure of the loan to close as quoted. See, e.g.,
Mortgage Foreclosures and Other Current Mortgage Credit Issues: Hearings on H.J. Res. 656
and H.R. 3306 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Development of the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1986) [hereinafter
Mortgage Credit Issues Hearings] (statement of John M. Teutsch, Jr., Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, Rainier Financial Services Company, Seattle, Wash. and Vice President,
Mortgage Bankers Association of America) ("At issue is whether the parties to such a commit-
ment are bound to honor such a commitment."). In any case, problems rarely arose before the
spring of 1986 because loans almost always closed at the quoted rate. The unprecedented
volume of business resulting from the precipitous drop in interest rates at that time, at least in
the views of most lenders, first triggered the crisis. Id.; see also id. at 117. Mr. Teutsch stated
that "[t]here is no historical precedent for the current mortgage volume, and perhaps more
importantly for the rapid upsurge in applications as interest rates decreased rapidly during
March and April [of 1986]." Id.; see also id. at 128-29 (statement of Leonard Shane, Chair-
man and President, Mercury Savings and Loan Association, Huntington Beach, Cal. and
Chairman, Legislative Policy Committee, United States League of Savings Institutions).
3. In 1987, Representative Dean Gallo of New Jersey referred to the lock-in crisis of
1986 as "last summer's horror stories." 133 CONG. REC. E2267 (daily ed. June 4, 1987).
4. Representative Gallo stated that "[a]gain this spring, ... [i]nterest rates guaranteed to
consumers for limited periods are going through the roof when, through no fault of the con-
sumer, the closing is delayed beyond the 'guaranteed' lock-in period." Id.
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borrowers, upset over having had lock-in agreements expire or dishonored
by lenders, lodged extraordinary numbers of complaints with various state
officials.5
Although a few consumers have recently sued lenders for reneging on
lock-ins,6 the more significant developments arising out of the lock-in shock
phenomenon have been legislative. Five states have enacted laws aimed at
requiring home mortgage lenders to honor lock-in commitments. 7 Of poten-
tially greater significance, Congress may act on the matter. The House of
Representatives has one bill pending8 and, reportedly, the staff of Senate
Banking Committee Chairman William Proxmire is preparing a parallel
bill.9 A number of states have bills pending 0 and at least one state has
achieved the same effect by regulation."1
This Comment examines the state and federal legislative trend against the
general background of consumer credit law as it relates to home mortgage
finance, and considers the ramifications of imposing one more layer of state
and federal regulation upon lenders. This Comment notes the advantages of
simplicity and uniformity available through a comprehensive federal law.
As a background for the present trend in favor of lock-in laws, this Coin-
5. According to Representative Gallo, 2500 consumers in Maryland and 1300 in New
Jersey experienced, and complained about, "mortgage rate shock." Id.
6. Eg., Precious, Would-Be Borrower Wins Suit Over Rejection of Application, Wash.
Post, Aug. 22, 1987, at El, col. 1 [hereinafter Precious, Would-Be Borrower] (discussing lock-
in case in Montgomery County, Md. Small Claims Court); see also Precious, Borrowers
Awarded $50,000 in Damages, Wash. Post, Sept. 5, 1987, at El, col. 5 [hereinafter Precious,
Borrowers Awarded $5,000] (Maryland Banking Commissioner awards $50,000 in damages to
17 borrowers upset over practices of single mortgage banking firm); Givens, Illinois Attorney
General Sues MB Companies, Real Est. Fin. Today, June 19, 1987, at 32, col. I (Illinois Attor-
ney General suing four major Chicago area mortgage lenders in part for breaching lock-in
agreements).
7. These five states are Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, and Washington.
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-38-111 to -114 (Supp. 1987); Act of Apr. 28, 1987, Pub. Act 87-73,
1987 Conn. Acts 93 (Reg. Sess.), reprinted in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. app. at 23 (West 1988);
MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. §§ 12-501, 12-512 (Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.206
(West Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.146.030 (Supp. 1988).
8. Residential Mortgage Credit Fairness Act of 1987, H.R. 2609, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.,
133 CONG. REC. H4261 (daily ed. June 4, 1987) [hereinafter H.R. 2609] (pending in House
Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs).
9. See Harney, Bill Would Eliminate "Lock-In Shock, " Wash. Post, June 6, 1987, at El,
col. 1; Mortgage Bankers Association of America, Washington Report, May 19, 1987, at 1,
col. 1.
10. Three such states are Arizona, California, and Pennsylvania. S. 1250, 38th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. introduced Feb. 4, 1987); S. 1120 and S. 1124, 1987-88 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
introduced Mar. 5, 1987); S. 7, 171st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. introduced Jan. 15, 1987); see also
State Legislatures Continue Push to Regulate Mortgage Activities-Not Just Commitments, In-
side Mortgage Fin., Aug. 7, 1987, at 6, col. 1 [hereinafter State Legislatures].
11. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, pt. 38 (1987).
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ment examines the general area of consumer credit law, which historically
had little to do with the area of home mortgage lending. 2 This examination
includes a review of some of the theories of litigation upon which borrowers
have founded actions against lenders, some that irate borrowers could use to
enforce lock-in provisions. Next, this Comment considers the five state laws
enacted to date and compares their provisions, particularly considering the
effects on a lender doing business in at least two of those five states. Finally,
this Comment analyzes the federal legislation in its currently proposed form,
and considers the question of whether federal preemption of state lock-in
laws, and/or state mortgage law generally, is likely or desirable.
I. CONSUMER CREDIT, MORTGAGE CREDIT, AND FEDERALISM:
THE BACKGROUND
A. Legislative Background
The history of consumer credit legislation, from the perspective of the
state-federal relationship, reveals how the area of mortgage lending has grad-
ually acquired a federal presence where once there was none. This evolution
has occurred in three distinct periods: pre-1968, 1968 to 1980, and post-
1980.
1. Pre-1968: The Labyrinth
Before 1968, the states alone regulated consumer credit.' 3 The pattern
essentially consisted of a general usury law' 4 and an assortment of excep-
tions especially geared to certain types of lenders, such as savings and loan
associations.' 5 Other exceptions included loans with a principal amount be-
low a certain ceiling, 16 and general exceptions to the usury law.' 7 These
laws combined in a complex tangle of independent, noncomprehensive, and
12. Traditionally, the term "consumer credit" has meant transactions other than mort-
gage loans (except, perhaps, second lien and other junior mortgages). See, e.g., B. CURRAN,
LEGISLATIVE TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT 14 (1965); R. ROHNER, THE LAW OF TRUTH
IN LENDING, 6.01, at 6-3 (1984). More recently, the line between the two has blurred. See
infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
13. See Malcolm, Consumer Credit-Probings into the Future, 26 Bus. LAW. 899, 899
(1971). For a comprehensive review of the legislation governing consumer credit (other than
mortgage lending) as of 1965, see generally B. CURRAN, supra note 12.
14. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28:2701-:2709 (1961).
15. For an example of a savings and loan act, see id. §§ 26:406-:407.
16. Such laws are usually called "small loan acts." See, e.g., id. §§ 26:601-:611.
17. Usury law exceptions typically are called "installment loan acts." See, e.g., KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 287.215 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1987). These laws allowed loans, not
subject to loan-type exceptions, made by lenders not covered by lender-type exceptions, to bear
interest at a rate greater than the usury rate if they satisfied certain requirements. See gener-
ally B. CURRAN, supra note 12, at 65-75 (discussing installment loan acts).
1988]
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noncoordinated regulation within any one state, with the pattern varying
from one state to the next.1
8
In the area of home mortgage lending, at both the state and federal levels,
regulation of creditors focused more on the type of entity than on the lend-
ing activities. Federally chartered savings and loan associations obeyed the
regulations of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). 9 The
FHLBB also regulated those state-chartered savings and loan associations
that chose to acquire the insurance of the Federal Savings and Loan Insur-
ance Corporation (FSLIC).2 ° However, state-chartered savings and loans
answered to state regulators as well.2" Thus, prior to 1968, state-chartered
savings and loans often contended with double regulation in all their activi-
ties, including mortgage lending.22
As another source of home mortgage funds, commercial banks also exper-
ienced the double regulation of state and federal authorities. State-chartered
banks faced an extensive and complex array of state laws governing their
operations.2 3 Meanwhile, one or two federal agencies might have exerted
some control simultaneously. Under the federal regulatory system, a bank
could fall under the jurisdiction of the Comptroller of the Currency,2 4 the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) 2 5 and/or the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
2 6
18. For a tabulation, in chart form, of the usury laws of all the states and their exceptions,
as of 1965, including citations, see B. CURRAN, supra note 12, at 140-43.
19. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, § 5(a), 48 Stat. 128, 132 (codi-
fied as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1982)). The Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB) currently implements its regulatory authority through the regulations found at 12
C.F.R. pt. 500 (1987). For a description of the history and functions of the FHLBB, see
generally Clarke, The Regulatory and Housing Functions of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, 26 Bus. LAW. 37 (1970).
20. Act of June 27, 1934, ch. 847, § 402, 48 Stat. 125 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1725 (1982)); see also 12 C.F.R. pt. 561 (1987); Clarke, supra note 19, at 40.
21. In 1965, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had savings and loan acts in
effect. See B. CURRAN, supra note 12, at 220-25.
22. This double regulation had a significant impact on the mortgage credit industry be-
cause savings and loans originated the bulk of such loans during this period. T. MARVELL,
THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD 10 (1969). "Savings and Loan Associations are by
far the most important home-financing institutions, accounting for three times as many home
mortgages as any of their nearest competitors." Id.
23. Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System (pt. 1), 52 VA. L. REV. 565, 580 (1966).
24. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (general provisions creating
the Office of Comptroller of the Currency). All federally chartered (national) banks answer to
the Comptroller of the Currency. Id. § 24(Seventh); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1987).
25. All member banks of the Federal Reserve System, which national banks must be, 12
U.S.C. § 222 (1982), and which state banks may be, id. § 321, abide by the Board's regulations.
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, 28 Stat. 251 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.); see also 12 C.F.R. § 201.1 (1987).
26. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provides insurance on deposits.
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Through this coexistence of state and federal chartering of banks, known
as the "dual system,"27 three distinct entities might have regulated an in-
sured, member, state-chartered bank: the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC,
and whatever state authority existed in its state.2 8 This created a complex
interaction of competing regulation, characterized by a lack of coordination
among the regulators.2 9
Private mortgage companies represented another major category of lend-
ing entities during this period. These institutions usually would originate
and close loans and then sell the loans to investors, rather than retain portfo-
lios of their own. These private mortgage companies constituted ordinary
corporations that existed solely to make mortgage loans, rather than deposi-
tory institutions of any kind. However, such corporations drew little atten-
tion from the state legislators, other than the ever-present usury statutes and
the occasional mortgage banker or mortgage broker licensing law. °
Beyond the regulation of the various types of financial institutions, the
federal mortgage insurers exerted yet another layer of control on home
mortgage lending. Any lender, regardless of its nature, that intended to offer
loans under any of the federal insurers' programs naturally would observe all
of that entity's regulations and other requirements in order to qualify for its
programs. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA)31 required regula-
Federal Reserve membership automatically includes a bank in this insurance plan. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1814(b) (1982). Nonmember banks may opt for insurance without joining the Federal Re-
serve system. Id. § 1815(a).
27. See Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 3-8 (1977).
28. For an extensive overview of the federal banking regulation system, see Hackley,
supra note 23, at 570-78.
29. One commentator graphically dubbed this situation a "tangled web." Scott, supra
note 27, at 7 (chart). For a bank that makes mortgage loans in several states, this picture
becomes even more complex. While banks were relatively local in the 1960's, the practice of
interstate banking has become quite common today. See infra note 179. The traditional ra-
tionale for preserving local regulation of consumer credit has been its local nature. See, e.g.,
Malcolm, supra note 13, at 900.
30. As of 1968, there were still only two licensing statutes in place, in Florida and in
Hawaii. Mortgage Brokerage Act, ch. 59-309, 1959 Fla. Laws 1153 (codified as amended at
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 494.01-.121 (West 1972 & Supp. 1987)); Mortgage Brokerage Act, ch.
228, 1967 Haw. Sess. Laws 339 (codified as amended at HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 454-1 to 454-8
(1985)).
Although rare then, such licensing laws have achieved more prominence today. Twelve
states had them in 1985, and more states are exhibiting a trend toward enactment of licensing
laws, similar to the lock-in law activity. See Negroni, Traps for the Unwary: Recent Legal
Developments in Mortgage Banking, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct. 1987, at 166, 169.
31. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was created by the National Housing
Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1750c (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
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tion by the department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 32 of
lenders making FHA loans. The Veterans Administration (VA) issued its
own regulations. 33 These two regulators added another dimension of com-
pliance considerations for mortgage lenders.
Finally, the quasi-federal secondary mortgage market associations 34 ex-
erted some control over the activities of all lenders that proposed to sell
loans to them. They refused, however, to view their own role as that of
regulators, then or now.
35
2. 1968 to 1980: Truth in Lending and the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code
From 1968 to 1969, two major pieces of legislation rendered slightly less
distinct the ostensibly separate areas of consumer credit law and mortgage
lending law. First, Congress enacted the federal Truth in Lending Act of
1968 (TILA). 36 Second, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws (NCCUSL) adopted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
(UCCC). 3 ' Both pieces of legislation, while nominally consumer credit laws,
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1715b (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also 24 C.F.R. pt. 200 (1987).
33. Congress gave the Veterans Administration (VA) authority to "guaranty" veterans'
home mortgage loans in the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284
(codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1832 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); see also 38 C.F.R.
pt. 36 (1987).
34. Out of the eventual three entities, only the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA or Fannie Mae), chartered by title III of the National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-
479, § 301, 48 Stat. 1246, 1252 (1934) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1723h (1982
& Supp. IV 1986)), actually existed prior to 1968. The Housing and Urban Development Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 802, 82 Stat. 476, 536 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1716-1723c (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), separated it into FNMA and the Government Na-
tional Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae). The Emergency Home Finance Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 303, 84 Stat. 450, 452 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1452
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), created the third player in the federally sponsored secondary mort-
gage market-the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie Mac).
35. See Kaplan & Qutb, The Regulatory Environment.- An Overview, in THE HANDBOOK
OF MORTGAGE BANKING: A GUIDE TO THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET 183, 183 (J.
Kinney & R. Garrigan eds. 1985). As Kaplan and Qutb point out, these organizations play an
ever increasing role in the mortgage market today because lenders originate a steadily growing
percentage of their loans for sale in the secondary market. Id. An expanding secondary mar-
ket furthers the trend toward a national, as opposed to local, home mortgage industry. See
infra note 179.
36. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter TILA]. This Act called upon the Federal Reserve Board
to issue implementing regulations. These are now found, as amended, at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226
(1987) (Regulation Z).
37. See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE XVII (West pamphlet 1969) [hereinafter
UCCC] (prefatory note). The UCCC, a product of years of research, hearings, conferences,
annual meetings, and drafting efforts by many experts, was created for adoption by the states
as a uniform law. Id. at XXI.
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took the significant step of bringing credit transactions secured by real es-
tate, to some extent, within their respective scopes.3"
Section 123 of the TILA permitted exemption of transactions in states
where laws "substantially similar" to the provisions of the TILA existed,
referred to as 'state exemption." 39 The UCCC apparently extended its cov-
erage to real estate transactions in order to mimic the TILA as perfectly as
possible, and thus, qualify as substantially similar. Thus, the NCCUSL at-
tempted to add a selling point to the UCCC by making it eligible for state
exemption.' In every other respect, it clung to the traditional view that
home mortgage transactions, a qualitatively different transaction, required
separate treatment.4 Ultimately, the NCCUSL did not succeed; most states
never accepted the UCCC.42 By 1980,"3 it became clear that the UCCC
would not provide the uniformity desired by some.44
The TILA contained a $25,000 ceiling on transactions subject to the Act
to provide an objective test for exempting transactions having a business or
commercial purpose.45 Implicitly, the inclusion of real estate transactions
under the TILA acknowledges that such transactions belong under the head-
ing of "consumer credit," even though they usually involve amounts greater
than $25,000.
Congress emphasized the concept of disclosure in the TILA. Some hoped
that requiring disclosure of information by creditors about the nature of the
credit transaction in a uniform fashion, including the interest charged,
would allow the consumer to make informed choices and thereby enhance
both competition among creditors and the general welfare of consumers.46
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 1603 (1982) (transactions greater than $25,000 exempted except those
secured by real estate); UCCC §§ 3.105, 3.301(1) (consumer loan generally does not include a
loan primarily secured by an interest in land, but does for limited purposes.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1982).
40. See UCCC at XVII-XIX (prefatory note).
41. See id. § 2.104 comment 2; Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 387, 388 (1968).
42. A total of 10 states adopted the UCCC in whole or in part. Of those, Utah has since
repealed it. See 1 Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) 4770 (June 18, 1985).
43. In 1975, Maine and South Carolina became the last two states to enact the UCCC.
Id.
44. See UCCC at XXI (prefatory note); Jordan & Warren, supra note 41, at 387. One
view explains that the UCCC was not widely accepted because it was overly "visionary" in the
area of rate regulation and not "visionary" enough when it came to the scope of its coverage or
its ability to handle future changes in the area of consumer credit. Miller & Rohner, In Search
of a Uniform Policy: State and Federal Sources of Consumer Financial Services Law, 37 Bus.
LAW. 1415, 1418 (1982).
45. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1962, 1986.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982) (Findings and Declaration of Purpose); Ill CONG. REC.
1988]
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Critics of this theory argued that disclosure failed to solve the problem,47 or
at least inadequately addressed the problem for poor consumers, the ones in
greatest need of help.48 The belief that disclosure would single-handedly
eliminate the ills of the consumer credit world has proved unfounded. The
string of further enactments following the TILA demonstrates this
conclusion.49
Congress, aware of the simultaneous efforts to produce the UCCC, did not
leave the TILA silent as to its relationship to state law. If it had, the TILA
might arguably have preempted much of the state law in the area of con-
sumer credit pursuant to the supremacy clause of the United States Consti-
tution.50 Instead, the TILA contained a deferential section that set forth a
rule, the "inconsistent" standard, for determining the preemptive effect of
the TILA on a given state law.5' Under this standard, the TILA preempts
state laws that are inconsistent with its provisions and then only to the ex-
tent of the inconsistency. However, the statute provides no guidance as to
what constitutes inconsistency. The Board promulgated Regulation Z, pur-
suant to the TILA's provisions, and interpreted "inconsistent" to mean:
(a) requirements to calculate the finance charge or annual percentage rate
(APR) differently; or (b) requirements that are different from the federal
16,424 (1965) (statement of Sen. Douglas); see also Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of Finance
Charges: A Rationale, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1299-1300 (1966); Note, Consumer Legislation
and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 747-49 (1967).
47. See generally Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1 (1969) (criticizing the theory of disclosure).
48. See Note, supra note 46, at 749-54.
49. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (1970) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (regulating behavior of credit
reporting agencies); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1511, 1516,
1517-21, 1525 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (re-
stricting discriminatory practices in lending); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No.
95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986))
(regulating practices of debt collectors).
50. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause provides that "[t]his Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land: and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." This provision may
manifest itself in a number of ways. First, Congress may preempt state law expressly, assum-
ing the preemptive law is constitutional. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
Second, Congress may preempt state law implicitly by occupying a particular area so perva-
sively as to permit an "inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement" the
federal scheme. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Congress might
also preempt state law in instances where one cannot possibly comply simultaneously with a
state and a federal law, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963), or where the state law undermines the objectives of a congressional act. Hines v. Da-
vidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1610 (1982).
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requirements regarding form, content, terminology, or time of delivery of
the required disclosures.5 2 However, creditors could make any such incon-
sistent disclosures, and avoid potential state liability, as long as they made
the disclosures separately.53 Thus, the TILA did not truly preempt "pre-
empted" state law requirements; lenders faced multiple disclosure require-
ments, and borrowers contended with a host of redundant disclosure
forms.5 4
3. 1980: The Truth in Lending Simplification Act and
Creeping Preemption
Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act of
1980 (TILSA)55 seeking to simplify the disclosures provided to consumer
borrowers and easing the compliance burden for creditors.56 The TILSA
changed the preemption rule, prohibiting compliance by creditors with pre-
empted state laws, even separately, and precluding state liability for such
noncompliance." The TILSA also required that the Board determine
whether state laws were "inconsistent" or "substantially the same."58 If the
state law is substantially the same, a lender may comply with it rather than
the TILA."9 However, Congress still provided no further assistance in de-
termining whether or not a state law is "inconsistent."
Congress apparently expected the Board to conduct a specific, line-by-line
survey of every state law and decide whether inconsistencies lurked
therein.' Whether or not the Board had the capability to perform such a
52. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(b)(1) (1982) (repealed as of Oct. 1, 1982).
53. Id. § 226.6(c).
54. In Mason v. General Fin. Corp., 542 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1976), for example, the court
held the creditor in violation of the TILA because it had mixed up state and federal disclosure
requirements and allowed "preempted" state disclosures to appear on the federal document.
Id. at 1235. The creditor was probably trying in good faith to assure that it met the myriad
disclosure requirements it had to satisfy; it stood to gain no practical advantage by over-
disclosing.
55. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132, 168 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1982)) [hereinafter TILSA].
56. S. REP. No. 73, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 280, 280-81.
57. TILSA, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 609, 94 Stat. 168, 173-74 (1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1610(a)). Compare 12 C.F.R. § 266.28(a) (1987) (current rule, under the TILSA) with 12
C.F.R. § 226.6(c) (1982) (old rule, prior to the TILSA, repealed as of Oct. 1, 1982).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1982).
59. Id. Compliance with state law is known as reverse preemption, which provided al-
most nothing new. Section 123 of the original TILA already provided for state exemption.
See supra text accompanying note 39. But note that only a state can request a state exemption
determination, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 app. B (1987), while a creditor, state, or other interested
party may request a reverse preemption determination. 12 C.F.R. § 226.28(b) (1987).
60. In congressional words: "Under this section, the Board is required to examine the
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massive project, it did not do so. Instead, the Board created a procedure by
which an interested party could apply for a determination on an ad hoc
basis,61 and established a rule for inconsistency: the "contradictory" stan-
dard. Under this standard, a state law that requires any disclosure or action
on a creditor's part that contradicts the federal requirements is inconsistent.
Contradiction occurs when the state law requires either the use of the same
term as the federal provisions require to represent a different amount or
meaning, or the use of a different term to represent the same item.62 Any
creditor, state, or other interested party may request a determination from
the Board regarding a particular state law under this standard. 63 In the ab-
sence of any further elaboration, this standard represents the most deferen-
tial end of the spectrum, given the wide range of interpretations that the
Board could have given to the term "inconsistent."
As defined, the term "contradictory" only helps as a standard of inconsis-
tency with regard to format and content of the disclosures required under
the TILA. Any kind of procedural requirements, such as the form or timing
of disclosures" or the rescission rights generally granted in most transac-
tions involving a security interest in the consumer's principal dwelling,65 do
not fit into the Board's definition because they do not relate to terms and
their meanings. The Board articulated another standard which serves better
for procedural requirements: the "impede or interfere" standard. 66 This ex-
tra rule fills the gap for procedural requirements that the contradictory rule
leaves open, although it, too, provides only a weak standard of preemption
for two reasons. First, it lacks precision. It remains difficult to determine
whether the state law interferes with the intent of the federal scheme unless
that means having a diametrically opposed purpose. Second, to contradict, a
state law must do more than just impede the operation of the TILA, it must
disclosure laws of each State." S. REP. No. 73, supra note 56, at 13-14, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 280, 291.
61. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 app. A (1987). The appendix provides the address to which an
interested party should send its request and lists the supporting documentation required: es-
sentially, all relevant state legislative and regulatory material and the requesting party's pro-
posed analysis. Id.
62. Id. § 226.28(a)(1).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 226.17(a), (b).
65. Id. § 226.23(a)(1).
66. 48 Fed. Reg. 4454, 4454 (1983). The test is whether the state requirement "signifi-
cantly impedes the operation of the federal law or interferes with the intent of the federal
scheme." Id. This bears a strong resemblance to the third branch of the federal preemption
doctrine, under Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)




do so "significantly." While the rule does not clearly delineate the threshold
of significance, it cannot mean that any and all impediments qualify as sig-
nificant, or else the Board might have omitted the qualifier, "significantly,"
altogether. State procedural requirements could exist that interfere with the
TILA's smooth procedural functioning but do not rise to the level of a sig-
nificant impediment, and that the TILA, therefore, does not preempt.67
Since 1980, Congress has shown a greater willingness to preempt state law
in the mortgage lending realm when it perceives a need. For instance, it
enacted the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980 (DIDMCA).68 Title V of the DIDMCA preempted state usury laws
until and unless the state acted expressly to override such preemption within
three years of its effective date.69 At that time, usury limits in some states
were much lower than returns available on other investments. In passing
title V, Congress intended to free up funds for mortgage loans that investors
would otherwise withhold from the market. 7' Although this differs from the
purpose of easing the burden of multiple laws, as in the case of the TILSA,71
the DIDMCA incidentally obtained that effect because the patchwork of
state usury laws yielded almost entirely to market determination of mort-
gage rates.
Two years later, Congress enacted the Garn-St Germain Depository Insti-
67. As the Board must make preemption determinations, because Congress chose not to
preempt entirely, no one can criticize it for selecting a standard that will minimize the poten-
tial for inconsistency and thereby the number of occasions for making such determinations.
Under this system, most state laws will remain unchallenged, and only those that clearly con-
tradict the TILA, that clearly create a significant impediment to the TILA's smooth operation,
or that clearly interfere with the federal intent underlying the TILA, will give rise to requests
for determination. When the Board receives a request, its task is simpler due to the limited
likelihood of meritless requests. The task is further simplified by the Board's requirement that
the requesting party supply a proposed analysis. See supra note 61. Rather than performing
its own analysis, the Board can review that of the requesting party and decide whether or not
to accept it. For a recent example of such a determination, see Truth in Lending; Determina-
tion of Effect on State Law; Indiana, 52 Fed. Reg. 33,596, 33,596-98 (1987) (proposed Sept. 4,
1987) (Board proposing to determine that the TILA preempts Indiana law for its inconsistent
use of same terminology). The fact that this constitutes only the sixth affirmative preemption
determination, see 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 supp. I, § 226.28(a)(8)-(12) (1987), demonstrates the scar-
city of such actions by the Board.
68. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter DIDMCA]. The TILSA is title VI of the DIDMCA.
69. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 note (1982).
70. S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S..CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 236, 254. As the report stated, Congress opted to preempt state usury laws
"[i]n order to ease the severity of the mortgage credit crunches of recent years." Id.
71. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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tutions Act of 1982 (Garn-St Germain Act),72 which provides for the pre-
emption of state laws governing the use of "due-on-sale" clauses in mortgage
instruments.73 Congress sought to reaffirm the authority of federal savings
and loan associations to enforce due-on-sale clauses and to grant equal au-
thority to other lenders.74 But Congress hardly needed to reaffirm the inde-
pendence of federal associations from state regulation. Section 5(a) of the
Home Owners' Loan Act gives the FHLBB a broad mandate to regulate
federal thrifts with the stated purpose of maximizing the flexibility essential
to keeping home loan funds available.75 In exercising that authority, the
FHLBB has declared its regulatory reach to be absolute.76 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has held that such a regulatory preemption, made in the
exercise of an administrator's judgment pursuant to congressional mandate,
has the same effectiveness as an act of Congress.77 Given the redundancy of
the preemptions under the DIDMCA and the Garn-St Germain Act as ap-
plied to federally chartered institutions, Congress must have intended to ac-
complish the placing of other lenders on an equal footing.
Title VIII of the Garn-St Germain Act also included a preemption of state
laws that restrict the making of adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) loans.78
This time, Congress made no pretense of "reaffirming" the authority of any
federally chartered institutions. It simply noted that all federally chartered
housing lenders had regulatory authority to make ARM loans. Congress,
therefore, declared its purpose of establishing parity in that area on behalf of
72. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.)) [hereinafter Gam-St Germain Act].
73. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1982). A due-on-sale clause in a mortgage instrument effectively
restricts the borrower's ability to subsequently transfer the home to a third party, whether
subject to the mortgage or otherwise, by giving the lender a right to declare the entire loan
balance due and payable if the borrower does so. Id. § 1701j-3(a)(1).
74. 12 C.F.R. § 591.1(b) (1987).
75. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
76. The FHLBB describes its own authority as "plenary and exclusive" and "preemptive
of any state law purporting to address the subject of the operations of a Federal association."
12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (1987). For the analogous position of the Comptroller of the Currency, as
to national banks, see id. § 34.2.
77. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982). This
case specifically addressed the extent of the FHLBB's ability to preempt a California law re-
stricting due-on-sale clauses, through regulation, based solely on the federal preemption doc-
trine and the congressional mandate of the Home Owners' Loan Act, and in the absence of an
express authorization to preempt state law. The Court held that effective preemption of state
law by a regulator does not depend upon such express authority if the regulator reasonably can
read its enabling statute as embracing such power. Id. at 154.
78. Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 801-




nonfederally chartered lenders. 79 To achieve this parity, Congress simply
established authority for all housing creditors, federally chartered or not, to
make ARM loans.8°
Thus, since 1980, Congress has chipped away at state involvement in three
distinct aspects of the residential mortgage lending industry, rendering each
subject only to federal regulation. In 1980, it eliminated state usury laws8
and, in 1982, it removed state restrictions on due-on-sale clauses and ARM
loans. 2 A two-point rationale justifies these preemptions. First, Congress
sought to permit federally chartered institutions to engage in a particular
practice in order to assure "flexibility," and thereby, the availability of funds
to meet the mortgage borrowing needs of the public, impliedly essential to
serve the ultimate policy of maximizing Americans' opportunities for home
ownership. Second, Congress sought to permit the same practice as other
lenders in order to preserve a level playing field and ensure parity among
lenders competing for borrowers. In each case, a single federal rule has dis-
placed the patchwork of state laws, resulting in nationwide uniformity.
However, this process has thus far united and simplified only single, isolated
sub-areas of the mortgage lending field. In other mortgage credit sub-areas,
nonfederally chartered entities, notably private mortgage bankers, continue
to operate under a competitive disadvantage.
B. Consumer Borrowers' Recent Litigation Theories Against Lenders
Until recently, consumers generally did not sue their creditors simply be-
cause of a failure to receive the loan that they had expected or for delays in
processing their loan applications. Borrowers may have perceived them-
79. 12 U.S.C. § 3801 (1982).
80. 12 U.S.C. § 3803(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). This preemption depended upon com-
pliance by a nonfederally chartered lender with the regulations of the appropriate federal regu-
lator for its type of institution. Id. § 3803. Because there is no such thing as federally
chartered private mortgage companies, and thus no federal regulator specifically appropriate
thereto, Congress lumped them, and "all other housing creditors," together with savings and
loan associations, subject to FHLBB regulation. Id. § 3803(a)(3). Perhaps Congress chose the
FHLBB for default regulatory duty because of the mortgage lending context of the legislation
and the fact that the FHLBB's charges-savings and loans-have always been the primary
entity in mortgage lending. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Proximity to the mort-
gage industry arguably qualified the FHLBB as best suited for the new task. With regard to
lock-in legislation, the approach of H.R. 2609 would eschew this logic. Drafted as an amend-
ment to the TILA, it would place regulatory responsibility upon the Board, rather than the
FHLBB. See generally 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 (1987) (Regulation Z, promulgated by the Board
under the TILA).
81. Usury laws were eliminated through title V of the DIDMCA. See supra text accom-
panying notes 68-69.
82. Titles III and VIII of the Garn-St Germain Act achieved these two preemptions. See
supra text accompanying notes 72-80.
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selves as helpless victims with no recourse, especially where their total injury
typically consisted of a nominal application fee. In addition, early case law
with regard to lock-ins was sparse, primarily because, until recently, lenders
seldom breached their lock-in agreements.13 Since 1983, however, consum-
ers have shown an increased willingness to sue when they feel that financial
institutions have wronged them.84 These consumers premised their suits on
a variety of theories, some of which the courts recognized as legitimate. This
Comment examines these theories for applicability to the lock-in situation.
1. Morosani: Interest Overcharges and RICO
In Morosani v. First National Bank of Atlanta, 85 the plaintiff alleged that
First National systematically obtained money through false pretenses by
agreeing to charge a rate of interest at a fixed margin above the prime rate
and to compute interest on a 360-day-year basis, without doing either.86 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed
Morosani's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
87
claim against the defendant bank "on the ground that 'the practice Plaintiff
complains of has not traditionally been treated as criminal in nature: i.e., it
is not a recognized form of criminal activity.' ,
88
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and
remanded for further proceedings, holding that obtaining money by false
pretenses represents a recognized form of criminal activity. 89 To reinforce
its position, the court cited the federal mail fraud statute which uses that
very language.90 The court further held that quoting one method of interest
computation and then using another method, more advantageous to the
lender, constitutes obtaining money by false pretenses. 9' According to the
Eleventh Circuit, because mail fraud under the federal statute lies expressly
83. Leonard Shane testified that "[tihe 60-day commitment has long been a standard in
the mortgage market because, until recently, everyone could reasonably expect the process to
be completed within that time frame." Mortgage Credit Issues Hearings, supra note 2, at 128.
84. See, e.g., Morosani v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 703 F.2d 1220 (11th Cir. 1983);
High v. McLean Fin. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1561 (D.D.C. 1987); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of
Hamilton v. Caudle, 425 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 1983); Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d
913, 702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1985); Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank of Md., 307 Md. 527,
515 A.2d 756 (1986); see also cases cited supra note 6.
85. 703 F.2d 1220 (11th Cir. 1983).
86. Id. at 1221.
87. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) [hereinafter RICO].
88. Morosani, 703 F.2d at 1221-22 (quoting Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp.
1019, 1022 (N.D. Ga. 1981)).
89. Id.
90. Id; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
91. Morosani, 703 F.2d at 1222.
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within the scope of RICO, 9 2 the district court erred in dismissing the claim.
Thus, a lender that agrees to a certain interest rate on a loan and subse-
quently charges more, making use of the United States Postal Service in the
process, 93 potentially faces civil RICO liability.
94
Although Morosani did not involve a lock-in breach, such a case would fit
the description of agreeing to one interest rate and charging another. Thus,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit might consider a
lock-in case amenable to civil RICO. The practical consequence of this anal-
ogy lies beyond the identification of a legal theory on which consumers frus-
trated by lock-ins could sue, and rests in RICO's treble damages provision.95
Thus, if consumers' disinclination to sue creditors who breach lock-in agree-
ments stems from the small amount in controversy, this fact might change
that attitude.
2 Perdue: Unconscionable Contract; Unfair Competition
In Perdue v. Crocker National Bank,96 a checking account customer chal-
lenged the six dollar charge assessed for bad checks (NSF charge). The
plaintiff signed a "signature card" that the bank kept on file.97 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the signature card, which contained various
terms of the checking account including authorization for the bank to make
the NSF charge, constituted a contract of adhesion.9" However, the court
also stated that it must enforce a contract of adhesion, unless the contract
was either outside of the reasonable expectations of the weaker party or un-
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
93. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). In practice, it would be a rare mortgage loan transaction
that does not make use of the Postal Service to transmit the loan approval letter, notices of
payments overdue, and a host of other documents mortgage lenders routinely mail to their
borrowers. The standard forms prescribed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for use in docu-
menting mortgage loan transactions even provide that the parties, when called upon to render
a notice of any kind under the terms of the note, mortgage, etc., shall provide said notice by
first class mail, if not in person. See, e.g., FNMA/FHLMC, Form No. 3021, 14 (1983) (stan-
dard deed of trust form for use in Maryland, paragraph on notices).
94. Beyond the obtaining of money by false pretenses and use of the postal service, RICO
would require only a pattern of such activity, which effectively means two or more instances,
and investment of income derived therefrom in any enterprise remotely connected with inter-
state commerce. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), 1962 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
95. Id. § 1964(c).
96. 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
97. Id. at 921, 702 P.2d at 508, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
98. Id. at 924-25, 702 P.2d at 511, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 353. The court described a contract
of adhesion as one where the stronger party provides the contract document, with no negotia-
tion, and the weaker party has only the option of adhering to it as it stands, or rejecting it
entirely. Id., 702 P.2d at 511, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
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conscionable.99 Although the court did not further discuss the "reasonable
expectations" side of the test, it did remand the case for a hearing to deter-
mine whether, under the circumstances, the signature card contract was
unconscionable. "
The elements of a classic contract of adhesion apply equally well to a lock-
in agreement as to the signature card contract in Perdue. In a typical lock-in
agreement, the lender drafts the document and the loan applicant either
signs it or goes without a lock-in. ° An equitable doctrine such as uncon-
scionability applies to contracts generally, °2 not narrowly to any special
term such as an NSF charge. Thus, under the line of reasoning in Perdue,
and given the proper factual findings, a court could conceivably hold a lock-
in agreement unconscionable. 13
The California court determined that the plaintiff could also establish a
claim under California's unfair competition statute' °4 if he could show de-
ception in either the signature cards themselves or in the manner in which
the bank presented them for signing. ' 5 This determination revealed another
potential theory for lock-in litigation, through its innovative underlying
premise that the unfair competition provisions exist to protect consumers as
well as business competitors. 0 6 Should other states follow this interpreta-
tion with respect to their unfair competition statutes, another cause of action
99. Id. at 925, 702 P.2d at 511, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
100. Id. at 928-29, 702 P.2d at 514, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
101. The California court interprets the contract of adhesion doctrine as involving a docu-
ment drafted by the stronger party and a "take it or leave it" posture forced upon the weaker
party. Id. at 924-25, 702 P.2d at 511, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 353. Of course, in a lock-in situation, a
borrower will still have his or her application processed, even without a lock-in, while in Per-
due, a bank customer could not have opened an account without signing the signature card.
But, a lender still has power to lock-in largely on its own terms, other than the interest rate
itself which must stay more or less in line with the market. Assuming a market where the
borrower would want to lock-in, due to rising rates, the lender still has unilateral power to
dictate the term for which the agreement will remain in effect, as well as considerable power to
determine whether the application gets processed before that term expires. When rates are
falling, the lender will not breach any lock-in, or, more likely, the borrower will never request
one, thus no issue arises.
102. See, e.g., id. at 925, 702 P.2d at 511, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
103. Arguably, equitable theories are unnecessary in a case where the agreement was sup-
ported by consideration, such as a lock-in fee. In such a case, should a lender fail to honor the
locked in terms, it would seem that a clear case for breach of contract exists, as the courts have
acknowledged. See High v. McLean Fin. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1561, 1565 (D.D.C. 1987); Jac-
ques v. First Nat'l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 537-38, 515 A.2d 756, 761 (1986); see also infra notes
117, 119, and accompanying text.
104. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17,200 (West 1987).
105. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 929, 702 P.2d at 514, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 356. Plaintiff had alleged
that the bank led customers to believe that it required the cards for identification purposes
only, with no contractual ramifications intended. Id., 702 P.2d at 514, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
106. Id., 702 P.2d at 514, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
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will be available to consumers seeking remedies when they do not receive
their locked in rates. Thus, Perdue offers two potential avenues of litigation
that might extend to the lock-in situation: unconscionability and unfair
competition.
3. Negligence in Handling Loan Applications.- Caudle, Jacques, High
In First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Hamilton v. Caudle, 10 7 the
lender had undertaken to assist the borrowers in obtaining a special type of
FHA loan, assured them that it had already approved the loan, and later
informed them that it had rejected their application."08 Based on these facts,
the Alabama Supreme Court sustained the plaintiff's theory of negligence
against the lender."° Citing ordinary negligence cases as authority, it ruled
that once First Federal voluntarily undertook to assist the Caudles, it had a
duty to proceed with due care, and that stating that the loan had approval
when in fact it had only conditional approval constituted a breach of that
duty."'l The court measured the damages as the difference between the cost
of the loan had First Federal made it under the FHA program and the more
expensive, conventional loan the Caudles had to obtain to cover their
needs. 1l
On facts similar to those in the Caudle case, the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals decided Jacques v. First National Bank of Maryland.112 Here, the
court found that a contract existed between the parties because the bank
promised to process the application and to lock in the current market inter-
est rate for ninety days. In consideration of this, the Jacques paid a $144
appraisal and credit report fee and effectively withheld themselves from the
market. The court viewed the latter consideration as creating a business
107. 425 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 1983).
108. Id. at 1051.
109. Id. at 1052.
110. Id. (citing McGaha v. Steadman, 410 So. 2d 420, 421 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (negligent
failure to renew insurance policy); Dailey v. City of Birmingham, 378 So. 2d 728, 729 (Ala.
1979) (wrongful death)).
111. Id. at 1052-53. The court failed to consider the fact that First Federal had not im-
properly denied the FHA loan. Rather, the court held that First Federal had negligently led
the Caudles to believe that they would qualify for the FHA program when, in fact, they would
not. Either way, the Caudles would have had to settle for a conventional loan, regardless of
whether First Federal had negligently misled them. Thus, the court ought to have measured
damages as the difference between the cost of a conventional loan at the time the Caudles
should have learned of their inability to qualify for the FHA loan and the cost of the same
conventional loan at the time they, in fact, learned of their lack of qualification, due to First
Federal's negligence. Indeed, if the cost of such a loan did not go up during that interim, the
Caudles suffered no actual damages.
112. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986).
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advantage for the bank. 113 Noting the public nature of the mortgage lending
business and the high degree of integrity required of bank officers in Mary-
land, the court found a concommitant duty of care arising out of that con-
tract.' 14 The lender had rejected the loan application, then made an offer to
lend a smaller amount to the Jacques. The Jacques ultimately decided to
close on that offer, because they could not find a better loan due to rising
interest rates. Furthermore, their purchase contract bound them to accept
any loan they could find, within certain parameters." 5 Forced to finance the
rest of the purchase price by liquidating part of their stock portfolio and
taking expensive personal loans," 6 the Jacques felt that the bank's sloppy
treatment of their application had caused them this unnecessary extra ex-
pense. They brought suit based on this argument and, ultimately, the Mary-
land Court of Appeals agreed. In the process, it found that a contract
existed which included among its covenants a lock-in of the rate.' 17
Because the court in Jacques recognized the lock-in as a contract, the Jac-
ques could have advanced a breach of contract theory if the bank had at-
tempted to change the interest rate. Moreover, the same rationale that the
court used, negligent handling of the application, may still have applied.
More recently, the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia, in High v. McLean Financial Corporation, "' cited Jacques and relied in
part on that case's reasoning, thus furthering the "negligent handling" the-
ory of lender liability for consumers. The court actually recognized five
causes of action that could conceivably have applied." 9 The plaintiffs in
High alleged that McLean had accepted their loan application, assuring
them of approval, and had, in fact, approved the application. Approxi-
mately one and a half months later, a second mortgage company, Ameri-
West, sent the plaintiffs a letter stating that it had denied their
application. 2 ° The Highs had had no indication before this point that their
loan application process involved AmeriWest.' 2 ' On these facts, the court
denied motions to dismiss claims based on the Equal Credit Opportunity
113. Id. at 537-38, 515 A.2d at 761.
114, Id. at 542-43, 515 A.2d at 763-64.
115. Id. at 530, 515 A.2d at 757.
116. Id., 515 A.2d at 757.
117. Id. at 537-38, 515 A.2d at 761.
118. 659 F. Supp. 1561, 1570 (D.D.C. 1987).
119. Of the five causes of action considered, the court dismissed one, breach of contract,
due to technical inadequacies in the pleadings. 659 F. Supp. at 1565. However, it dismissed
the claim without prejudice. Id. This, as in Jacques, was a tacit acknowledgment that the
breach of contract theory itself is viable. Jacques, 307 Md. at 537-38, 515 A.2d at 761.




Act,122 common law fraud,' 23 and breach of fiduciary duty. 124 It also sus-
tained a negligence claim, observing that on questions of first impression
under District of Columbia law, its courts frequently look to Maryland for
guidance. The federal court found such guidance in the Jacques case.'
25
The Caudle, Jacques, and High cases not only demonstrate the viability of
a negligence theory as applied to lenders that breach lock-in agreements, but
also suggest the further possibilities of common law fraud, breach of fiduci-
ary duty, and breach of contract. Although the plaintiffs did not actually
rely upon these latter causes of action, the courts acknowledged them all. In
addition, Perdue adds the prospect of unconscionable contract and/or unfair
competition theories and, under the logic of Morosani, even the possibility of
criminal liability exists, with an accompanying civil right of action.
Two questions arise in the light of these potential theories of litigation:
first, why more borrowers with breached lock-in agreements have not sued;
and second, why state legislatures find it necessary to enact statutory causes
of action for aggrieved borrowers, and whether borrowers will avail them-
selves of such statutes.
4. Recent Months: Lock-In Breach Cases
Recently, a few trial courts and state administrative agencies have
awarded damages to mortgage borrowers or would-be borrowers for
breaches of lock-in agreements. A district judge in Maryland Small Claims
Court,' 2 6 on facts very similar to the classic scenario that emerged from the
Caudle, Jacques, and High cases, ordered a savings bank to refund a $700
application fee to the applicant.' 2 7 The applicant had a lock-in in effect and
a closing date scheduled, but the bank suddenly rejected his application a
few days before the closing date.' 2 1 Up until the rejection, the lender had
continually assured the borrower that his mortgage loan application would
suffer no calamity, despite his apprehension over the dramatically rising
market interest rates of the time.' 29 The consumer argued successfully, pro
se, that the lender rejected his loan on no valid criteria, but rather as a pre-
tense to avoid making a loan at roughly two percentage points below
122. Id. at 1563-64.
123. Id. at 1566-67.
124. Id. at 1568-69.
125. Id. at 1569-70.
126. Precious, Would-Be Borrower, supra note 5, at El, col. I (discussing lock-in case in
Montgomery County, Maryland Small Claims Court).
127. Id.
128. Id. at ElO, cols. 1-2.
129. Id. at ElO, col. 2.
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market. ' 30
In a recent unreported case, the Maryland Banking Commissioner's office
made a determination to distribute the entire licensing bond, posted by a
now defunct mortgage company, pro rata to seventeen of that company's
disgruntled customers for damages they had suffered through dealing with
it.13 Some of those awards compensated borrowers for higher rates that
they had to pay after having lock-in commitments dishonored.
132
Enough consumers have complained in the Chicago area to prompt the
Illinois Attorney General to file suit against eleven mortgage companies for
allegedly misleading borrowers into thinking they had locked in rates which
were promised but never delivered. All of these companies allegedly delayed
the processing of applications to get out of lock-in commitments.
13 3
While these cases may represent a new trend of consumer litigiousness,
they are insubstantial when compared to the thousands of complaints that
state administrative agencies around the country have received.' 34 Again, if
consumers do not take advantage of already existing litigation theories, the
question remains as to whether they will pursue newly created statutory
rights. The states seem to believe that, with a clear statutory basis, as op-
posed to common law theories, consumers will bring suits more readily. If
130. Id. at E10, cols. 1, 3.
131. The Banking Commissioner's office has substantial regulatory authority over mort-
gage bankers. MD. FIN. INST. CODE §§ 12-507.1, 12-508 (1986). Pursuant to that authority,
it may award some or all of the bond which licensees must post, id. § 12-504(c)(2), to anyone
with a cause of action against the licensee. Id.
132. See Precious, Borrowers Awarded $50,000, supra note 6, at El, col. 5. According to
the Banking Commissioner's office, the only quasi-official record of this matter is the set of
"Proposed Bond Distribution" letters, which the Commissioner wrote to the bonding com-
pany upon determining that the mortgagee had violated the law (available at the Maryland
Office of the Banking Commissioner, Baltimore, Md.).
133. People v. All Am. Mortgage Co., No. 87CH08750 (Ill. Cook County Cir. Ct., Ch.,
filed Sept. 10, 1987); People v. First Capital Mortgage, Inc., No. 87CH08749 (Ill. Cook
County Cir. Ct., Ch., filed Sept. 10, 1987); People v. Prairie State Mortgage Co., No
87CH08698 (Ill. Cook County Cir. Ct., Ch., filed Sept 9, 1987); People v. Mortgage Corre-
spondents, Inc., No. 87CH08748 (Ill. Cook County Cir. Ct., Ch., filed Sept. 8, 1987); People v.
Bede Corp., No. 87CH06292 (Ill. Cook County Cir. Ct., Ch., filed June 25, 1987); People v.
Northern Ill. Mortgage Co., No. 87CH06291 (Ill. Cook County Cir. Ct., Ch., filed June 25,
1987); People v. Woodfield Mortgage Corp., No. 87CH05094 (Ill. Cook County Cir. Ct., Ch.,
filed May 22, 1987); People v. First W. Mortgage Corp., No. 87CH05093 (Ill. Cook County
Cir. Ct., Ch., filed May 22, 1987); People v. Bell Mortgage Co., No. 87CH04880 (Ill. Cook
County Cir. Ct., Ch., filed May 19, 1987); People v. United First Mortgage Corp., No.
87CH04879 (Ill. Cook County Cir. Ct., Ch., filed May 19, 1987); People v. Midwest Funding
Corp., No. 87CH04877 (Ill. Cook County Cir. Ct., Ch., filed May 19, 1987); see also Suit Filed
in IL Against Five Mortgage Firms, Real Est. Fin. Today, Sept. 18, 1987, at 38, col. 2; Givens,
Illinois Attorney General Sues MB Companies, Real Est. Fin. Today, June 19, 1987, at 32, col.
1.
134. See supra note 5; see also State Legislatures, supra note 10, at 6-7.
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such a statute will not make any difference, however, then it will only in-
crease the burden of compliance for lenders and the volume of disclosure
matter and procedural red tape with which consumer loan applicants must
contend.
II. THE NEW STATE LAWS: AN OVERVIEW
At this writing, five states have enacted lock-in laws.' 35 Despite their
common objective, lack of uniformity among them creates the potential to
make interstate mortgage lending a cumbersome business. More states join-
ing this trend will only serve to amplify this effect. An examination of the
specific requirements of the Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota,
and Washington laws follows.
A. Colorado
The Colorado statute' 36 treats the issue of rate lock-ins relatively lightly,
requiring only that lenders put such agreements in writing and that the
agreements state an expiration date. 137 Thus, it requires a written agree-
ment, which a lender could simply incorporate into its standard loan appli-
cation form, but does not provide any deadline for providing it. The
Colorado legislature apparently enacted this law for other reasons, 138 with
the one sentence having to do with lock-ins added almost as an afterthought.
B. Connecticut
Under Connecticut's new law, 139 a lender may not enter into a lock-in
agreement without putting it in writing." ° Such written agreements must
135. See statutes cited supra note 7. One might say that more than five lock-in "laws"
exist, if the count includes state regulations. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. This
Comment confines the scope of its state lock-in law overview to actual legislative acts. Just as
other state bills still pending may continue to expand the amount of state activity concerning
lock-ins, supra note 10, and even more states may well introduce similar measures in the fu-
ture, the regulatory level adds another dimension to the trend. Nevertheless, an examination
of the varying provisions of the five state acts in force as of this writing, and the knowledge
that they represent the leading edge of a growing trend, will suffice to illustrate the point
intended here, that the lack of uniformity in regulating lock-in procedures adds to an existing
patchwork pattern which makes compliance burdensome.
136. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-38-111 to -114 (Supp. 1987).
137. Id. § 38-38-112(1).
138. The overall act addresses many aspects of mortgage lending, lock-ins being just one,
including broker fees and escrow accounts, id. § 38-38-111, and standards of proper loan serv-
icing. Id. § 38-38-113.
139. Act of Apr. 28, 1987, Pub. Act 87-73, 1987 Conn. Acts (Reg. Sess.), reprinted in
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. app. at 23 (West 1988).
140. Id. § 2(a)(1), reprinted in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. app. at 23, 24 (West 1988).
1988]
Catholic University Law Review
provide an expiration date, as under the Colorado act,' 4 ' and that date may
not be sooner than the end of the lender's good faith estimate of the period
needed to process the application and either approve or reject it.' 42 The
purpose of this section is to prevent a lender from locking in for sixty days
only to take sixty-one days for underwriting. If a lender and borrower enter
into a lock-in agreement, the lender must close at the rate promised thereun-
der, unless it can attribute the delay in one of four specified ways to the fault
of the applicant.14 3 In addition, if a commitment expressly requires that the
applicant satisfy any condition, as is common practice, the lender may not
set a closing date sooner than seven calendar days after the issuance of such
commitment.' 44 Finally, unless the lender either closes the loan or rejects
the application within a specified period from the date of application, an




The new law in Maryland1 46 has the most stringent standards for compli-
ance. It requires a lender acceptifig a loan application to provide a financing
agreement within ten days thereafter. 4 7 The law does not require a lender
to bind itself to the terms in the financing agreement, but, if not, the lender
must issue a second document, no later than seventy-two hours before the
scheduled time for closing.' 48 The second document, known as a commit-
ment letter, must render all terms of the agreement binding.'
49
The terms that these two documents must disclose and lock in include not
only the interest rate and discount points but also numerous other details of
the loan agreement, and a statement of the term for which the lock-in agree-
ment remains in effect.' In other words, Maryland, like Colorado and
Connecticut, requires the statement of an explicit expiration date on the
lock-in.
141. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-112(1) (Supp. 1987).
142. Act of Apr. 28, 1987, Pub. Act 87-73, § 2(a)(1), 1987 Conn. Acts (Reg. Sess.), re-
printed in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2(a)(1) app. at 23, 24 (West 1988).
143. Id. § 2(b), reprinted in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. app. at 23, 24-25 (West 1988).
144. Id. § 2(d)(2), reprinted in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. app. at 23, 26 (West 1988).
145. Id. § 2(c), reprinted in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. app. at 23, 25-26 (West 1988). This
section specifies a period of 90 days or 120 days, depending on the loan to value ratio and
whether or not it is a government related loan. Id.
146. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. §§ 12-501, 12-512 (Supp. 1987).
147. Id. § 12-512(a)(1).
148. Id. § 12-512(b)(1).
149. Id. But the lender need not issue the commitment letter at all if it designated none of
the terms in the financing agreement as floating. Id. §§ 12-512(a)(3), (b)(l).
150. Id. § 12-512(a)(2).
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The Maryland law has no provision, such as Connecticut's, requiring that
a lender honor the lock-in agreement beyond its stated expiration date.
However, the Maryland statute does provide for an aggrieved borrower to
sue a lender for damages arising out of a violation. 51 This conceivably
could amount to the same thing if one construes damages for a dishonored
lock-in as the difference in dollars between the loan on the terms the lock-in
agreement had promised and the loan that a borrower ended up taking in-
stead. Thus, by measuring damages as the difference between the loan
promised and the loan made, the lender effectively makes the loan promised.
In effect, the Maryland law forces the parties to form a lock-in agree-
ment.15 2 In those cases where the lender and borrower form a lock-in agree-
ment only because the seventy-two hour limit has arrived, the fact that a
date for closing necessarily exists suggests that the loan has received ap-
proval, because lenders would presumably not bother setting a closing date
unless they intended to make the loan. In that regard, such a forced lock-in
differs from the definition of lock-in established for purposes of this Com-
ment, because the latter definition involves an agreement entered into before,
and conditioned upon, loan approval. 53 However, the parties may often
select a date for closing without first waiting for loan approval, in which case
Maryland law establishes an absolute deadline for locking in, even under this
Comment's definition, whether the parties wish to or not.
D. Minnesota
Except for the common requirements of putting a lock-in agreement in
writing15 4 and expressing a definite expiration date,' 5 Minnesota's new law
appears to have little in common with the other state laws in terms of disclo-
sure requirements. The required disclosure of the expiration date, like that
of the Connecticut act, must reflect the reasonably anticipated duration re-
quired to process the loan application.' 56 The Minnesota law also requires
disclosure of the circumstances under which the borrower may close at more
151. Id. § 12-512(d)
152. If the lender and borrower do not agree to lock in at/or soon after application, they
must do so not later than 72 hours prior to closing. Either way, they must form a lock-in
agreement. Id. §§ 12-512(a)(3), (b)(l). None of the other laws have such an absolute
requirement.
153. See supra note 1.
154. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.206 (West Supp. 1988).
155. Id. § 47.206, subdivision 2(1).
156. Compare Act of Apr. 28, 1987, Pub. Act 87-73, § 2(a)(l), 1987 Conn. Acts 93, 93
(Reg. Sess.), reprinted in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. app. at 23, 24 (West 1988) with MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 47.206, subdivision 2(1) (West Supp. 1988).
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favorable terms than those disclosed in the agreement,157 the steps necessary
to arrive at closing, 158 the fact thatthe borrower may enforce the agree-
ment, 159 and the consideration required for the agreement."
This law implies that a written statement of current terms will operate as
an offer to lock in unless accompanied by a disclaimer to the effect that it
does not operate as such an offer. One provision states that a written state-
ment of current market terms does not constitute an offer. This provision
further states that such a statement must include a disclaimer as described
above, but does not state explicitly what result will obtain if it does not.
161
On its face, the law logically implies that a written statement not accompa-
nied by a disclaimer constitutes an offer to lock in.
As between the Connecticut-style extension of the lock-in period for as
long as necessary to close the loan,' 62 and the Maryland-style damages for
violations, arguably amounting to the same effective result,' 63 the Minnesota
law more closely follows the Maryland approach. A lender who causes un-
reasonable delay in processing a loan application beyond the expiration date
faces liability for the borrower's actual out-of-pocket damages as a result,
including present value of any increased costs over the life of the loan."'
E. Washington
Washington's new law 165 essentially follows the same minimal approach
to lock-ins as Colorado's. Very brief in its treatment of lock-ins, the law
instead concentrates on other matters. But it does require that a lender put
any agreement to lock in a specific interest rate, or other loan terms, in writ-
ing.' 66 Aside from this requirement, the Washington law makes no further
procedural or substantive provisions regarding lock-ins. It classes a viola-
157. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.206, subdivision 2(2) (West Supp. 1988).
158. Id. § 47.206, subdivision 2(3).
159. Id. § 47.206, subdivision 2(4).
160. Id. § 47.206, subdivision 2(5). In other words, the lender must disclose the amount of
the lock-in fee. It may seem odd that all the laws do not require this disclosure, but only this
one, and possibly the Washington law, does so. See infra note 166.
161. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.206, subdivision 5 (West Supp. 1988).
162. See supra text accompanying note 143.
163. See supra text accompanying note 151.
164. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.206, subdivision 7(a) (West Supp. 1988). The law does not
define "unreasonable delay," although it does illustrate the term with a nonexhaustive list. Id.
§ 47.206, subdivision 7(d).
165. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.146.030 (Supp. 1988).
166. Id. This writing must disclose "the cost, terms, and conditions" of a lock-in agree-
ment. Id. § 19.146.030(3). Subsection (3) does not clearly convey what "cost" refers to, unless
the term means the lock-in commitment fee, like the Minnesota provision. See supra note 160.
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tion as a misdemeanor. 167
III. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE STATE LAWS
Once a lender has devised forms and procedures that comply with any of
the other laws, it has necessarily complied with the lock-in requirements of
the Colorado and Washington acts.
161
However, the written agreement required in Minnesota could not satisfy
the law of Maryland. 169 In addition, the lender must provide the commit-
ment letter under Maryland law no later than seventy-two hours before clos-
ing, 170 while Connecticut does not permit closing any sooner than one week
after executing the lock-in agreement in most cases. 17 1 Conceivably, a
lender could develop a uniform policy of not locking in later than Connecti-
cut's one week before closing, no matter what the jurisdiction of the transac-
tion. However, Maryland borrowers might insist on floating the rate until
the last permissible moment. A lender cannot force a lock-in any sooner
than seventy-two hours before closing because, until the law requires a lock-
in, nothing compels the borrower to do so.
Only Maryland's law requires a lock-in. ' 72 Lenders could establish a uni-
form policy of requiring a lock-in in every state, but freedom of the market-
place suffers accordingly because such an approach takes away the otherwise
purely business decision of whether or not to offer a lock-in. Lenders that do
not require a lock-in will gain a business advantage through the flexibility
that they can provide, because borrowers do not always want to lock in.
Connecticut's law requires a lender to honor the agreement beyond its
good faith estimate-based expiration date.173 Minnesota also requires a good
faith estimate-based date, 174 but neither it nor Maryland requires the lender
to honor the agreement after the expiration date. Instead, if lock-ins expire
167. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.146.110 (Supp. 1988).
168. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-112(1) (Supp. 1987) and WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 19.146.030 (Supp. 1988) with Act of Apr. 28, 1987, Pub. Act 87-73, § 2(a)(1), 1987
Conn. Acts 93, 93 (Reg. Sess.), reprinted in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2(a)(1) app. at 23, 24
(West 1988), MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 12-512(a)(1) (Supp. 1987) and MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 47.206, subdivisions 2(1), 3 (West Supp. 1988).
169. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.206, subdivision 2 (West Supp. 1988) with MD.
FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 12-512(a)(2) (Supp. 1987).
170. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 12-512(b)(1) (Supp. 1987).
171. Act of Apr. 28, 1987, Pub. Act 87-73, § 2(d)(2), 1987 Conn. Acts 93, 95 (Reg. Sess.),
reprinted in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. app. at 23, 26 (West 1988).
172. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. §§ 12-512(a)(3), (b)(1) (Supp. 1987); see also supra note
152 and accompanying text.
173. Act of Apr. 28, 1987, Pub. Act 87-73, § 2(b), 1987 Conn. Acts 93, 94 (Reg. Sess.),
reprinted in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2(b) app. at 23, 24-25 (West 1988).
174. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.206, subdivision 2(1) (West Supp. 1988).
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without the loans closing, in violation of the law, these states allow borrow-
ers to sue for damages 17 1 which may well give the same result. 176 As a prac-
tical matter, this means that lenders might as well honor lock-in
commitments without regard to their expiration dates. That, in turn, means
that an expiration date has no meaning, even though four of the five statutes
require disclosure of one. 1
77
Connecticut has elaborate procedures concerning refunding of fees in the
event of a failure to close. 178 If a lender were to seek uniformity by comply-
ing with this requirement as though it applied in all states, it would encoun-
ter unpalatable, if not prohibitive, costs. Instead, it must establish a single,
odd exception in its forms and procedures for Connecticut.
For a mortgage lender doing business in more than one state, 179 life entails
a confused assortment of state-specific forms and procedures. One set exists
for each state, creating an array of authorities to which each lender must
answer. The new lock-in laws aggravate this situation by adding additional
patches to the crazy-quilt. 8 ' Further, based on the trend so far, each state
will add a patch of a different color. While the laws cannot represent actual
conflicts, because any given loan need only comply with one state's law, the
175. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. §§ 12-512(d) (Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.206,
subdivision 7(a) (West Supp. 1988).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 151, 162-64.
177. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-112(1) (Supp. 1987); Act of Apr. 28, 1987, Pub. Act 87-
73, § 2(a)(1), 1987 Conn. Acts 93, (Reg. Sess.), reprinted in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. app. at
23, 24 (West 1988); MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. §§ 12-512(a)(2) (Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 47.206, subdivision 2(a) (West Supp. 1988). Only Washington requires no disclosure
of an expiration date on a lock-in agreement. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.146.030 (Supp.
1988). H.R. 2609, the pending federal bill, would prohibit expiration dates on lock-ins. See
infra note 183 and accompanying text.
178. Act of Apr. 28, 1987, Pub. Act 87-73, § 2(c), 1987 Conn. Acts 93, 94 (Reg. Sess.),
reprinted in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. app. at 23, 25-26 (West 1988).
179. The Supreme Court decided in 1985 that states may legally form interstate banking
agreements With one another. Northeast Bancorp. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 178
(1985). At that time, commentators had already noted the trend away from localized and
toward interstate lending. See, e.g., Miller & Rohner, supra note 44, at 1416-17. With the
trend today among mortgage lenders to sell their loans in the secondary market, either whole
or packaged into various securitized forms, see Kaplan & Qutb, supra note 35, at 183, the
president of the Mortgage Bankers Association of America envisions not just an interstate, but
an international mortgage market in the near future. French, Mortgage Banking: Global in
Reach, Real Est. Fin. Today, Oct. 9, 1987, at 2, col. 1. The mortgage lender that operates in
only one state today falls more within the exception than the rule.
180. At a minimum, they add one more document to the lender's array: the lock-in agree-
ment writing which all of the laws require. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-112(1) (Supp. 1987);
Act of Apr. 28, 1987, Pub. Act 87-73, § 2(a)(l), 1987 Conn. Acts 93, 93 (Reg. Sess.), reprinted
in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. app. at 23, 24 (West 1988); MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. §§ 12-
512(a)(l) (Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.206, subdivision 3 (West Supp. 1988); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 19.146.030 (Supp. 1988).
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differences among them increase the burden on lenders' procedures and per-
sonnel. The new laws have already generated much work for lenders' com-
pliance counsel. This will most likely result in higher rates to the borrower,
because lenders, like any other business, pass their increased costs on to their
customers.
IV. FEDERAL LOCK-IN LEGISLATION: WILL IT COME, WILL IT
PREEMPT STATE LAW, AND SHOULD IT?
A. The Pending Legislation
The bill now pending in the United States House of Representatives Com-
mittee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, H.R. 2609,181 amounts to
another lock-in law, with the same essential thrust as the state laws. It con-
tains several notable features. First, it requires that lenders issue lock-in
commitments in writing no later than three days after application.' 82 Sec-
ond, the bill provides for a flat prohibition of any lock-in agreement expir-
ing183 except when the consumer causes unreasonable delay. 84 Third, it
creates a customer's right to withdraw an application, essentially without
penalty, lasting for three days from the time the lender delivers the lock-in
agreement document.
1 85
At this writing, the bill sits in committee without making much progress,
although the subcommittee reportedly plans to hold hearings."8 6 Thus, the
181. See H.R. 2609, supra note 8. The main section of H.R. 2609 provides for the addition
of a new subsection to section 128 of the TILA. Id. § 2. Thus, citations herein to the principal
provisions of H.R. 2609 use the subdivision numbering of the proposed subsection (e).
182. Id. § 128(e)(5)(A).
183. Id. § 128(e)(2). This provision stands out as extraordinary, contrary to the state
measures, and, possibly, preemptive of them to that extent. See infra note 196. It also stands
little chance of popularity among mortgage bankers, who believe that it ignores the realities of
the secondary market. Cf Mortgage Credit Issues Hearings, supra note 2, at 119 (testimony of
John M. Teutsch, Jr.) ("[The Mortgage Bankers Association] believes there is no justification
for any requirement that quoted interest rates be committed to beyond the expiration date,
where the processing delays are attributable to events or elements of the loan application pro-
cess that are totally outside the scope of the lender's control."). It is likely, should Congress
enact H.R. 2609 with such a provision in it, that the mortgage banking industry may see an
end to the practice of offering lock-ins at all. This will not be a viable alternative in Maryland,
however, which now effectively requires lock-in agreements on mortgage loans. See supra note
152 and accompanying text.
184. H.R. 2609, supra note 8, § 128(e)(4).
185. Id. § 128(e)(6). Under this provision, a borrower could go to as many lenders as he or
she desires, extract a binding lock-in commitment from each one, and then accept the best one,
simply withdrawing all the other applications within the three day period granted.
186. Telephone interview with Bonnie Caldwell, Staff, House Committee on Banking, Fi-
nance, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Housing (Jan. 20, 1988).
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bill's likelihood of enactment is unclear. The activity on the Senate side187
also defies assessment because no bill has appeared yet. But it appears less
likely to emerge in the shape of a bill, especially as Senator Proxmire intends
to retire after the current session of Congress. 8 ' Even if federal legislation
does eventually come forth, it may or may not resemble the present H.R.
2609.
B. Slim Likelihood of Preemption
One could argue that title V of the DIDMCA already preempts the state
lock-in laws1"9 inasmuch as they purport to control the charging of interest
and therefore constitute usury laws subject to preemption.190 But the better
view would say that the laws in question, as consumer protection measures
rather than usury laws, evade preemption under the DIDMCA.' 9'
As to whether H.R. 2609, if enacted, would preempt the state laws, the
fact that the bill proposes an amendment to the disclosure provisions of the
TILA' 92 indicates that it probably would not. The amendment effectively
would turn the disclosure document already required under the TILA
193
into a lock-in agreement, unless it expressly states otherwise.' 94 This has the
advantage, from a simplistic standpoint, of not introducing another disclo-
187. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
188. Senator Proxmire's aide, having responsibility for the planned Senate bill, also feels
that federal action grows less likely all the time, as long as the current interest rate market
remains stable. Without volatility in the market, the political impetus for legislation fades.
Telephone interview with Bob Malakoff, Staff, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Housing (Jan. 22, 1988).
189. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
190. Cf Letter from Harry W. Quillian, General Counsel, FHLBB, to Francis X. Pugh,
Maryland Assistant Attorney General (May 8, 1987) (available from the FHLBB upon re-
quest) (opining that DIDMCA preempts Maryland statute prohibiting the charging of interest
in advance). General Counsel Quillian reasoned that the DIDMCA preempts state limitation
addressing the amount of interest a lender may charge on a mortgage loan. He also viewed a
limit on when a lender may charge interest as a limit on how much interest a lender may
charge. Conceivably, then, one could argue that a law restricting lock-in procedures effects a
limitation on interest--especially in the case of the Maryland law which prohibits floating rates
for the last three days prior to closing. See supra note 152.
191. The legislative history of the Connecticut act supports this view. The Connecticut
bill's sponsor stated that, he proposed "a very good consumer bill," that "[sought] to deal with
two important consumer issues." Connecticut House of Representatives Floor Debate Tran-
script, Reg. Sess. 1987, at 2495 (April 1, 1987) (emphasis added). In his floor address urging
passage, Representative Jepsen also emphasized that the bill aimed to regulate procedures, as
opposed to substance or content of the agreement, and that its terms, including interest rate,
would therefore remain within the discretion of the lender. Id. at 2498. Thus, this law did not
constitute a usury law.
192. See supra note 181.
193. 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (1982).
194. H.R. 2609, supra note 8, § 128(e)(1), (3).
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sure document into the process. The case law theories discussed earlier have
this same advantage. But, as a corresponding disadvantage, the proposed
amendment cannot preempt much, if any, of the state lock-in laws, because
of the weak preemption criteria in effect under the TILA and Regulation
Z.' 95 As long as the Regulation Z "contradictory" standard remains in ef-
fect and the TILA continues to preempt only to the extent of inconsistency
as so defined, the state laws will remain concurrently in force with the fed-
eral law. 1
96
With no preemption whatsoever, a lender operating in Maryland, for in-
stance, would be required to issue the TILA disclosure within three days of
application,' 97 the financing agreement within ten days of application, 98
and, if the financing agreement does not create a binding lock-in, a commit-
ment letter no later than seventy-two hours before closing.' 99 This excessive
paper work will create a real and substantial burden for both the lender and
the consumer.
C. The Need for Preemption
Some commentators have argued for federal preemption of the entire area
of consumer credit, including mortgage lending. 2° Reasons cited include:
the higher costs to creditors resulting from the multitude of laws, confusion
of borrowers due to excess documentation, the disparity of regulation of
state-chartered and federally chartered institutions, and even the possibility
of double recovery by consumers entitled to both state and federal
remedies.2° '
Those who argue against federal preemption raise a states'-rights rationale
claiming that Congress should not occupy the area of consumer credit which
once was the exclusive domain of state law.2 °2 The basis of this position lies
195. See supra notes 50-67 and accompanying text.
196. An interesting possible exception to the failure of the federal lock-in bill to preempt
the state laws lies in the fact that it precludes a lock-in agreement from ever expiring, while all
of the state laws require an expressly stated expiration date. The "impede or interfere" stan-
dard of contradictory state law, see supra note 66, arguably permits the conclusion that H.R.
2609, if enacted, would preempt the state requirements to disclose a definite expiration date
because those requirements would impede the operation of the TILA, as amended.
197. 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (1982).
198. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 12-512(a)(1) (Supp. 1987).
199. Id. § 12-512(b)(1).
200. See, e.g., Leonard & Tidwell, Consumer Credit Regulation: Is Federal Preemption
Necessary?, 35 Bus. LAW. 1291 (1980).
201. Id. at 1303, 1305-08.
202. See, e.g., Malcolm, supra note 13, at 900; see also S. REP. No. 73, supra note 56, at 14,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 280, 291 (Reverse preemption is a
"workable compromise" that will "still show deference to the laws of the States.").
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in the supposed local nature of consumer credit; specifically, that the best
regulation of a local phenomenon occurs on the local level.203 But the un-
derlying premise of the local character of consumer credit has lost its valid-
ity. Indeed, the trend since the early 1970's away from local markets and
toward interstate lending2° has amplified the need for uniformity across
state lines. But sweeping preemption of state consumer credit law, however
compelling in abstract principle, in practice will probably not occur anytime
soon.
20 5
Looking to the narrower area of mortgage lending, the chances of a fed-
eral preemption seem somewhat better. The recent DIDMCA/Garn-St
Germain Act preemptive trend216 suggests that Congress perceives a need to
exercise greater federal authority in the area. The proposition that federally
chartered lending institutions enjoy virtually full preemption of state laws
governing mortgage lending has at least the implicit imprimatur of Con-
gress.20 7 Thus, state lock-in laws, and much of the states' other mortgage
lending law, apply only to private mortgage lenders and, except to the extent
that such laws excuse them, to state-chartered banks, and to other deposi-
tory institutions. The rationale of DIDMCA and the Garn-St Germain Act
to afford those lenders the same competitive benefit as federally chartered
institutions derive from preemption, 20 ' readily extends to all of the con-
sumer protection measures in the area of mortgage lending. 20 9 Congress
should act to make it so, and perhaps it intends to, though it seems to believe
that it can more efficaciously achieve the desired end by acting slowly. Chip-
ping away at the mortgage lending industry,210 instead of sweeping away the
whole body of state mortgage law in one act, will meet with less political
resistance in the aggregate. Congress realizes that whichever regulator re-
ceives the new responsibility for overseeing the mortgage credit field will
handle it more easily if it receives authority incrementally.
The logical place for the next chip is in the area of lock-ins, because the
area already needs federal action. Furthermore, the logical time to preempt
203. Malcolm, supra note 13, at 900.
204. See generally supra note 179.
205. See, e.g., Miller & Rohner, supra note 44, at 1432.
206. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
207. Cf supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
208. Id.
209. Arguably, reverse preemption available under the TILA "levels the playing field."
See supra note 59 and accompanying text. But this argument has two problems. First, the
TILA does not extend to all aspects of mortgage lending by any means. Second, reverse pre-
emption does not totally solve the disadvantage. The burden of complying with multiple state
laws, even if each of them had reverse preemptive status, would still exist while federal institu-
tions answer to the same single set of rules in all states.
210. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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is now, before more states enact lock-in laws, thus avoiding any further com-
plications. Each of the other areas in which Congress has yet to preempt
state law, directly or by extension through the federal regulators, ought to
receive the benefit of federal preemption for the same reason that underlies
the existing preemptions-providing a level playing field for nonfederally
chartered lenders. But, for the reasons just given, lock-in laws stand out as
the best choice for the next step in that direction.
To achieve federal preemption of lock-in laws, Congress must do one of
three things: (1) abandon the approach taken by H.R. 2609 of regulating
lock-ins through an amendment to the TILA and enact an independent
law;2 1 (2) modify the preemptive rule under TILA so that it will at least
preempt redundant, as well as "inconsistent," state provisions;21 2 or (3) reg-
ulate lock-ins through a TILA amendment, but with a section that has its
own preemption standard, separate and more thorough than the existing
standard.2 3 The last alternative appears best because it preserves the advan-
tage of a TILA amendment, which alternative (1) forsakes, yet also avoids
the overreaching result that alternative (2) would yield.21 4
Assuming that Congress chooses to preempt state lock-in laws, it then
must decide how extensively it should do so. Congress may not see absolute
preemption as necessary or even desirable. 215 The DIDMCA method of pre-
211. The bill as it presently stands would preempt little to nothing. See supra notes 192-96
and accompanying text. But regulating lock-ins through a TILA amendment has the advan-
tage of avoiding the imposition of yet another form upon the loan process and this alternative
would sacrifice that advantage.
212. While this would help with the state-to-state variance problem that reverse preemp-
tion does not solve, see supra note 209, it would also have an impact far beyond mortgage
lending since the TILA has a much wider scope. It would result in a federal core of consumer
credit disclosure law around which states may customize to suit local needs, subject, of course,
to any other federal preemptions in effect. One proposal would call for such an arrangement,
with a test for allowable state overlays that would require the state to demonstrate that its
proposed additional law would provide significantly greater consumer protection and not un-
duly increase the compliance burden on creditors. See Leonard & Tidwell, supra note 200, at
1308-09. Regardless of the merits of such proposals, they seem to go farther than Congress
wishes. See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
213. An even broader, but compatible, approach than the present proposal would be to
enact a new "Relation to Other Laws" section to the TILA which preserves the existing, weak
preemption standard for all consumer credit transactions other than residential mortgage
transactions and establishes complete preemption for mortgage transactions. Thus, not only
the newly proposed lock-in provisions, but all aspects of the TILA having to do with mortgage
lending would become preemptive of state law. Again, the policy of assuring mortgage fund
availability nationwide, see supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text, applies appropriately.
214. See supra notes 211-12. Thus, regulating lock-ins through an amendment to the
TILA with its own distinct, custom-crafted preemption standard preserves the advantage of
not creating another piece of paper while also not preempting more of state law than Congress
really wants to preempt.
215. Cf DIDMCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 note (1982). Under the DIDMCA preemption
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emption provides a good model because it is moderate in its approach. This
method allows states to override federal preemption, but requires the state
legislature to feel strongly enough about the matter to legislate actively on it.
This provides a means of reassuring those who would oppose preemption on
federalism grounds, but still achieves extensive preemption as the default
course in the absence of state action. States would have the ability to decide
the issue for themselves, but would do so with the knowledge that federally
chartered institutions will enjoy the advantages of preemption regardless of
what states do. State legislatures must decide, therefore, whether such an
advantage would suffice to preclude effective competition on the part of pri-
vate and state-chartered lenders. If they believe that this would happen, the
state legislators would have to consider the possibility that such nonfederal
entities would abandon the mortgage market within their state, which could
cause a tightening of mortgage funds available to their constituents. With
each successive aspect of the mortgage lending industry that Congress
preempts but the state overrides, this effect might grow more pronounced.
Thus a state would have to consider not only how it believes overriding any
given federal preemption measure would affect its intra-state mortgage mar-
ket, but also the likelihood that Congress will further exaggerate that effect
through subsequent preemptive enactments. Nevertheless, state legislators
may very well find unpersuasive the entire preceding line of conjecture.
Under the DIDMCA model of mitigated preemption, it retains its ability to
respond accordingly.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment proceeds from the assumption that all parties concerned
stand to benefit by adding elements of uniformity and simplicity to the regu-
lation of consumer credit. Ultimately, the trend of consumer credit away
from an essentially local nature toward a nationwide nature and the relative
failure of the UCCC have heightened the need for federal preemption. Yet it
remains unlikely to occur in any broad manner.
Congress, however, has displayed some tendency toward expanding fed-
eral presence in the limited area of residential mortgage lending, founded on
the longstanding imperative of assuring availability of home financing funds,
and thereby furthering the American dream of home ownership for the aver-
age citizen. While this trend of federal involvement may not extend far
enough at this time to justify calling it a pervasive occupation of the field,




sufficient to allow an inference that Congress intends to leave the states no
room to participate, it may reach that point yet, and indeed it should.
Undertaking preemption of mortgage lending through this gradual ap-
proach may not satisfy the purist because it delays the necessary and inevita-
ble result, but it offers the advantages of a smoother transition and, not
inconsequentially, easier implementation over the resistance of its oppo-
nents. The transition is smoother because it allows whichever federal entity
would have to assume the additional regulatory responsibility to react and
meet that responsibility over time, instead of becoming overburdened by the
responsibility to regulate all aspects of private mortgage banking at once.
The latter situation could conceivably make the solution worse than the
problem.
Congress should continue the trend by acting to preempt state lock-in
laws, through whatever federal legislation eventually emerges. To do so
would constitute nothing more than the continuation and logical extension
of a sound, longstanding policy.
Paul A. Mondor
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